- Add traefik-auth filter: ban IPs with 10+ HTTP 401/403 in 5 min
- Add forgejo-ssh jail: ban after 3 failed SSH attempts (24h ban)
- Both jails are active; forgejo-ssh already detected 8 real attempts
- Traefik access.log now written to /opt/services/traefik/logs/
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
firewall.yml:
- Allow 172.16.0.0/12 and 10.0.0.0/8 on ports 80/443 so act_runner
job containers can reach git.csrx.ru (Forgejo via Traefik)
- Without this, Cloudflare-only rules broke CI/CD pipeline
unattended_upgrades.yml (new):
- Install unattended-upgrades + apt-listchanges
- Configure auto-apply of security patches only (not all updates)
- Auto-clean every 7 days, remove unused deps
- No auto-reboot (manual control over kernel reboots)
base/tasks/main.yml:
- Add unattended_upgrades.yml to task sequence
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Traefik traefik.yml.j2:
- Add forwardedHeaders.trustedIPs with all Cloudflare CIDR ranges
on both web and websecure entrypoints so rate limiting and
CrowdSec see real visitor IPs, not Cloudflare proxy IPs
firewall.yml:
- Replace open HTTP/HTTPS rules with per-CIDR allow rules
scoped to Cloudflare IP ranges only
- Direct access to ports 80/443 bypassing Cloudflare is now blocked
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add gitea/act_runner:0.3.0 to docker-compose stack on runner-jobs network
- Add act_runner config template and directory provisioning
- Add FORGEJO_RUNNER_TOKEN to env template
- Add CI deploy SSH public key to authorized_keys via base role
- Create .forgejo/workflows/deploy.yml: syntax-check on PR, deploy on push to master
- Add .claude/launch.json with ansible-playbook configurations
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
